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ABSTRACT
The problem of decentralized power allocation for competitive
rate maximization in a frequency-selective Gaussian interfer-
ence channel is considered. In the absence of perfect knowledge
of channel state information (CSI), a distribution-free robust
game is formulated. A robust-optimization equilibrium (RE) is
proposed where each player formulates a best response to the
worst-case interference. The conditions for existence, unique-
ness and convergence of the RE are derived. It is shown that the
convergence reduces as the uncertainty increases. Simulations
show an interesting phenomenon where the proposed RE moves
closer to a Pareto-optimal solution as the CSI uncertainty bound
increases, when compared to the classical Nash equilibrium un-
der perfect CSI. Thus, the robust-optimization equilibrium suc-
cessfully counters bounded channel uncertainty and increases
system sum-rate due to users being more conservative about
causing interference to other users.
Index Terms— Rate maximization, robust games, waterfill-
ing, decentralized power control, Gaussian interference channel
1. INTRODUCTION
The problem of competitive rate maximization is an important
signal-processing problem for power-constrained multi-user
systems. It involves solving the power control problem for
mutually interfering users operating across multiple frequen-
cies. The classical approach to rate maximization has been
finding globally optimal solutions based on waterfilling [1].
However, the major drawback of this approach is that these
solutions require centralized control. These solutions are in-
herently unstable in a competitive multi-user scenario, since
a gain in performance for one user may result in a loss of per-
formance for others. Instead, a distributed game-theoretic ap-
proach is desirable and is being increasingly considered only
over the past decade.
The seminal work on competitive rate maximization [2]
uses a game-theoretic approach to design a decentralized al-
gorithm for two-user dynamic power control. This work pro-
posed a sequential iterative waterfilling algorithm for reach-
ing the Nash equilibrium (NE) in a distributed manner. A
Nash equilibrium of the rate-maximization game implies that
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given that the power allocations of other users is constant, no
user can further increase the achieved information rate uni-
laterally. However, this work and others extending this work
such as [3], [4] and [5] all assume perfect channel state in-
formation. This is a very strong requirement and generally
cannot be met by practical wireless systems.
The traditional game-theoretic solution for systems with
imperfect information is the Bayesian game model [6] which
uses a probabilistic approach to model the uncertainty in the
system. However, a Bayesian approach is often intractable
and the results strongly depend on the nature of the probabil-
ity distribution functions.
The issue of bounded uncertainty in specific distributed
optimization problems in communication networks has been
investigated in [7] where techniques to define the uncer-
tainty set such that they can be solved distributively by robust
optimization solutions are presented. In [8], incomplete-
informationfinite games have been modelled as a distribution-
free robust game where the players use a robust optimization
approach to counter bounded payoff uncertainty. This robust
game model also introduced a distribution-free equilibrium
concept called the robust-optimization equilibrium. However,
the results in [8] for the robust game model are limited to
finite games, which is not applicable here.
We present a distribution-free robust game formulation
for the rate-maximization game where non-cooperative users
formulate best responses to worst-case interference to counter
channel uncertainty. We analyse the robust-optimization
equilibrium (RE) for this game and derive sufficient con-
ditions for its existence and uniqueness. We propose a
decentralized algorithm where the players use an iterative
waterfilling solution to converge to the robust-optimization
equilibrium under certain sufficient conditions. Compared
with the Nash equilibrium for the rate maximization game un-
der perfect CSI [5], we show that the conditions are stronger
under channel uncertainty. We compare the global efficiency
of the RE and the NE through simulations and show that
RE has higher efficiency due to users being more conser-
vative about causing interference under uncertainty which
encourages better partitioning of the frequencies among the
users.
Notations used: The expectation operator is denoted by
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E{·}. The quantity [A]ij refers to the (i, j)-th element of A.
R
m×n
+ is the set of m × n matrices with real non-negative
elements. The spectral radius (largest eigenvalue) of matrix
A is denoted by ρ(A) [9]. The operation [x]ba is defined as
[x]ba = a if x ≤ a; x if a < x < b; b if x ≥ b.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a system similar to the one in [5], which is a
frequency-selective Gaussian interference channel with N
frequencies, composed of Q SISO links. Ω  {1, . . . , Q}
is the set of the Q players (i.e. SISO links). The quantity
Hrq(k) denotes the normalized frequency response of the
k-th frequency bin of the channel between source r and desti-
nation q. The variance of the zero-mean circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian noise at receiver q in the frequency bin k
is denoted by σ¯2q(k). Let σ
2
q (k)  σ¯
2
q (k)/|Hqq(k)|
2 and the
total transmit power of user q be NPq. Let the vector sq 
[sq(1) sq(2) . . . sq(N)] be the N symbols transmitted by user
q on the N frequency bins and pq(k)  E{|sq(k)|2}/Pq
be the power allocated to the k-th frequency bin by user
q and pq  [pq(1) pq(2) . . . pq(N)] is the power alloca-
tion vector. The power allocation vector of each user q
has two constraints: (a) Maximum total transmit power for
each user, E{||sq||22} ≤ NPq; (b) Spectral mask constraints,
pq(k) ≤ p
max
q (k). The power allocation vectors are public
information, i.e. known to all users.
Each receiver estimates the channel between itself and all
the transmitters, which is private information. This estimate
is assumed to have a bounded uncertainty of unknown distri-
bution. For simplicity and tractability, the uncertainty in the
channel state information in each frequency is deterministi-
cally modelled under an ellipsoid approximation [10] as
Fq =
{
Frq(k) + ΔFrq,k :
∑
r =q
|ΔFrq,k|
2 ≤ 2q
}
, (1)
for k = 1, . . . , N, where q ≥ 0 ∀ q ∈ Ω is the degree of
uncertainty and
Frq(k) 
|Hrq(k)|
2
|Hqq(k)|2
, (2)
with Frq(k) being the nominal value. We can consider uncer-
tainty in Frq(k) instead of Hrq(k) because a bounded uncer-
tainty in Frq(k) and Hrq(k) are equivalent, but with different
bounds.
3. ROBUST RATE-MAXIMIZATION GAME
According to the robust game model [8], each player formu-
lates a best response as the solution of a robust (worst-case)
optimization problem for the uncertainty in the payoff func-
tion (information rate), given the other players’ strategies. If
all the players know that everyone else is using the robust
optimization approach to the payoff uncertainty, they would
then be able to mutually predict each other’s behaviour. The
robust game Grob where each player q formulates a worst-case
robust optimization problem can be written as, ∀ q ∈ Ω,
max
pq
min
Frq
N∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r =q Frq(k)pr(k)
)
s. t. Frq ∈ Fq, pq ∈ Pq, (3)
where Fq is the uncertainty set which is modelled under el-
lipsoid approximation as shown in (1) and Pq is the set of
admissible strategies of user q, which is defined as
Pq 
{
pq ∈ R
N :
1
N
N∑
k=1
pq(k) = 1,
0 ≤ pq(k) ≤p
max
q (k), k = 1, . . . , N
}
.
(4)
The optimization problem in (3) using uncertainty sets is
equivalent to the form represented by protection functions [7]:
∀ q ∈ Ω,
max
pq
min
ΔFrq,k
N∑
k=1
log
(
1+
pq(k)
σ2q (k)+
∑
r =q
(Frq(k)+ΔFrq,k)pr(k)
)
s. t.
∑
r =q
|ΔFrq,k|
2 ≤ 2q, pq ∈ Pq. (5)
From the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality [9], we get∑
r =q
ΔFrqpr(k) ≤ q
√∑
r =q
p2r(k). (6)
Using (6), we get the robust game Grob as, ∀ q ∈ Ω,
max
pq
N∑
k=1
log
(
1+
pq(k)
σ2q (k) +
∑
r =q
Frq(k)pr(k)+ q
√∑
r =q
p2r(k)
)
s. t. pq ∈ Pq. (7)
4. ROBUST-OPTIMIZATION EQUILIBRIUM
We now present the robust waterfilling solution to the opti-
mization problem in (7) in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. The solution to the robust optimization problem
of user q in (7) for a given set of power allocations of other
users p−q  {p1, . . . ,pq−1,pq+1, . . . ,pQ} is given by
pq = RWFq(p−q),
where the robust waterfilling operator
[
RWFq(p−q)
]
k
is de-
fined as⎡
⎣μq − σ2q(k)−∑
r =q
Frq(k)pr(k)− q
√∑
r =q
p2r(k)
⎤
⎦
pmaxq (k)
0
, (8)
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for k = 1, . . . , N, where μq is chosen to satisfy the power
constraint (1/N)
∑N
k=1 p

q(k) = 1.
The robust waterfilling operation for each user is a dis-
tributed worst-case optimization under bounded channel un-
certainties. Compared with the original waterfilling operation
in [5] under perfect CSI (i.e. q ≡ 0), we see that an addi-
tional term has appeared in (8) for q > 0.
Intuitively speaking, this term acts as a penalty for allocat-
ing power to frequencies having a large product of uncertainty
bound and norm of the powers of the other players currently
transmitting in those frequencies. This is because the users
assume the worst-case interference from other users and are
thus conservative about allocating power to such channels.
The solution to the game Grob is the robust-optimization
equilibrium (RE). At any RE of this game, the optimum action
profile of the players {pq}q∈Ω must satisfy the following set
of simultaneous waterfilling equations: ∀q ∈ Ω,
pq = RWFq(p

−q). (9)
This equilibrium can be computed using a modified asyn-
chronous iterative waterfilling algorithm [5] which uses the
robust waterfilling operator RWFq(·). It can easily be verified
that the RE reduces to the Nash equilibrium of the system [5]
when there is no uncertainty in the system. In Section 5, we
compare the global efficiency of the robust-optimization equi-
librium and Nash equilibrium through simulations and show
that the RE has a higher efficiency due to a penalty for inter-
ference which encourages better partitioning of the frequency
space among the users.
The non-negative matrices E and Smax ∈ RQ×Q+ are de-
fined as
[E]qr 
{
q, if r = q,
0, otherwise,
(10)
and
[Smax]qr 
⎧⎨
⎩
max
k∈Dq∩Dr
Frq(k), if r = q,
0, otherwise,
(11)
where Dq is any subset of {1, . . . , N} such that Dminq ⊆
Dq ⊆ {1, . . . , N}. Dminq is defined as [5] D
min
q  {k ∈
{1, . . . , N} : ∃ p−q ∈ P−q such that
[
RWFq(p−q)
]
k
= 0}.
The sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of the
RE of the game Grob is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Game Grob has at least one robust-optimization
equilibrium for any set of channel matrices and transmit pow-
ers of the users. Furthermore, the robust-optimization equi-
librium is unique and the asynchronous iterative waterfilling
algorithm based on the robust waterfilling operator RWFq(·)
used to reach the robust-optimization equilibrium will con-
verge if
ρ(Smax) < 1− ρ(E), (12)
where E and S are defined in (10) and (11) respectively.
We can easily see that this condition reduces to condition
(C1) in [5] as expected in the absence of uncertainty, i.e. when
q ≡ 0. Since ρ(E) ≥ 0, the probability that a given system
converges to the RE decreases as the degree of uncertainty
increases.
Corollary 1. When the degrees of uncertainty of all the Q
users are equal to , the sufficiency condition in (12) for the
robust-optimization equilibrium of the game Grob can be writ-
ten as
ρ(Smax) < 1− (Q− 1). (13)
This expression explicitly shows how the degree of uncer-
tainty and the number of users in the system affect the con-
vergence to the equilibrium using an iterative waterfilling al-
gorithm. For a fixed degree of uncertainty, as the number of
users in the system increases, there is a larger amount of un-
certain information in the system. Hence, the probability that
a given system will converge to the RE will decrease as the
number of users in the system increases.
5. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present some simulation results to study
the impact of channel uncertainty on the RE by comparing it
with the ideal scenario of NE under perfect CSI. The simu-
lation parameters are presented in Figure 1. We study three
important aspects, namely the percentage of convergence, the
total information rate observed at the receivers and the addi-
tional number of frequencies with zero power allocations at
the RE when compared to the NE against the percentage of
uncertainty δ.
In Figure 1a, we observe that as the uncertainty δ in-
creases, the fraction of trials that converge under the RE de-
creases. This is as expected from Corollary 1, which defines
the relation between the convergence conditions and uncer-
tainty. As the uncertainty increases, the worst-case interfer-
ence increases and thus convergence does not occur. In con-
trast, in Figure 1b we see that the total rate increases with
uncertainty.
In Figure 1b, we see that the total information rate at the
NE under perfect CSI is less than the rate at the RE under im-
perfect CSI and that the gap in performance increases as the
uncertainty increases. This may seem surprising at first as the
NE has access to better information than the RE. However, in
a game-theoretic situation, better information does not neces-
sarily mean better performance. Furthermore, the NE is well-
known to be inefficient in a global sense of total rate [11].
Under imperfect CSI, the power allocation using the RE1 in
(8) and (9) has higher total information rate as uncertainty in-
creases. This is because the users are more cautious about
using frequencies with significant interference, thus reducing
1(8) and (9) are in terms of absolute uncertainty  while the simulations
use relative uncertainty δ. They are equivalent to one another.
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Fig. 1: Simulation results for a system with σ¯ = 0.1, Q = 5 users and N = 16 frequencies over 10000 runs. Channel gains Hrq(k) ∼
CN (0, 1) for r = q, Hqq(k) ∼ CN (0, 2.25). Channel uncertainty model: nominal value Frq(k) = F truerq (k)(1 + erq(k)) with erq(k) ∼
U(− δ
2
, δ
2
), δ < 1. Figs (b) and (c) are averaged over trials where the RE converges. In Fig (b), both rates are observed through the true
channel values F truerq (k). The NE scheme allocates power using F
true
rq (k), while the RE scheme uses Frq(k).
the total amount of interference in the system. Note that, for
fairness, we have averaged the rates over the same trials for
the RE and NE. The NE always converges when the RE con-
verges (from [5, Theorem 1] and Theorem 2), however the
converse is not always true. The increase in the NE rate curve
with δ is due to the bias in averaging only over the runs where
the RE converges.
In Figure 1c, we observe that, for the average used, the
total number of channels across all users that have zero
power allocation at the RE increases when compared with
the NE. This implies that the users are using smaller number
of frequencies, which demonstrates the better partitioning of
the frequency space among the users to reduce interference.
Hence, this leads to the higher information rates observed
in Figure 1b. The simulation results suggest that schemes
similar to the RE can move closer to Pareto optimality for
rate-maximization games.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented a novel approach for rate-maximization
games under bounded channel state information uncertainty.
We introduced a novel distribution-free robust game formu-
lation for the rate-maximization game. We presented the
robust-optimization equilibrium for this game and conditions
for its existence, uniqueness and convergence. Our simulation
results indicated an interesting effect of such a robust formu-
lation retaining a decentralized structure, where the equi-
librium tends to move closer to the Pareto optimal solution.
This framework can be extended to MIMO rate-maximization
games, cognitive radio and other non-cooperative games.
Acknowledgements
We thank Dr. Ishai Menache, MIT for his input on robust game the-
ory and Dr. Gesualdo Scutari, Hong Kong University of Science
and Technology for initial guidance and advice on waterfilling algo-
rithms.
7. REFERENCES
[1] T.M. Cover and J.A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory,
Wiley-Interscience, August 1991.
[2] W. Yu, G. Ginis, and J.M. Cioffi, “Distributed Multiuser Power
Control for Digital Subscriber Lines,” IEEE JSAC, vol. 20, no.
5, pp. 1105–1115, Jun 2002.
[3] Z. Luo and J. Pang, “Analysis of Iterative Waterfilling Al-
gorithm for Multiuser Power Control in Digital Subscriber
Lines,” EURASIP Journal on Applied Signal Processing, vol.
6, 2006.
[4] K.W. Shum, K.K. Leung, and C.W. Sung, “Convergence of It-
erative Waterfilling Algorithm for Gaussian Interference Chan-
nels,” IEEE JSAC, vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 1091–1100, 2007.
[5] G. Scutari, D.P. Palomar, and S. Barbarossa, “Asynchronous
Iterative Water-Filling for Gaussian Frequency-Selective Inter-
ference Channels,” IEEE Trans. on Information Theory, vol.
54, no. 7, pp. 2868–2878, July 2008.
[6] M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory,
MIT Press, 1999.
[7] K. Yang, Y. Wu, J. Huang, X. Wang, and S. Verdu, “Distributed
Robust Optimization for Communication Networks,” in IEEE
INFOCOM 2008, April 2008, pp. 1157–1165.
[8] M. Aghassi and D. Bertsimas, “Robust Game Theory,” Math-
ematical Programming, vol. 107, no. 1, pp. 231–273, 2006.
[9] R. A. Horn and C. R. Johnson, Matrix Analysis, Cambridge
University Press, 1985.
[10] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization, Cam-
bridge University Press, March 2004.
[11] G. Scutari, D.P. Palomar, and S. Barbarossa, “Optimal Lin-
ear Precoding Strategies for Wideband Noncooperative Sys-
tems Based on Game Theory-Part I: Nash Equilibria,” IEEE
Trans. on Signal Processing, vol. 56, no. 3, pp. 1230–1249,
March 2008.
3161
